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Book Reviews 
Critical Writings, 1953-1978 by Paul de Man, ed. Lindsay Waters. Minneapo-
lis, Mn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Pp. lxxiv + 246. $39.50, cloth; 
$14.95, paper. 
To read this collection of articles from Paul de Man's career is to be forci-
bly reminded of how brutally the fashion-driven world of literary criticism 
can displace styles and approaches, not to mention individual reputations. 
One can buy a copy of Representations and see at a glance how the profession 
has changed in one short decade. Can our present day stars of gender 
studies, culture critique and socio- and psychocriticism even be practicing the 
same craft as the author under review? Like the return of the repressed, the 
panoply of anthropological interests scorned by de Man now have possession 
of the debate. Although its most recent piece is less than fifteen years old, 
the volume has an antiquarian feel, in tone and sensibility as much as in the-
oretical purport. The past from which these pages come is indeed another 
country from the one most critics now inhabit. 
True, the emigres have kept many of the old customs: many an article 
whose ostensible topic is radically other still ends up looking, in its tech-
niques and its way of proceeding, very like de Man (or more usually Jacques 
Derrida). Nevertheless, a sea-change in critical activity has occurred; and it 
takes more than a controversy over a collaborationist youth to explain the 
full extent of that shift. 
It would not, however, be possible to confront such a massive question di-
rectly. The most this reviewer can do is to indicate the terrain de Man's cri-
tique habitually visits, and give a rough topography of the foreign country 
that was recently so familiar and is now so faint. 
The terrain is surprisingly easy to map. Oddly enough, de Man's occa-
sional pieces may be more revealing of his critical agenda than his more fa-
mous, elaborate efforts. Like any reviewer, he must assume the guise of the 
fox, who knows many things. But taken together, these essays sketch more 
the profile of the hedgehog, who knows one great thing: the essence of the 
literary. 
It may seem presumptuous, of de Man or of me, to say that he purports to 
"know" the literary. But at the very least, the essays show the persistent striv-
ing for an "ontology" which is to demonstrate "the being of the poetic as 
such" (p. 58). De Man's ontology uses the terminology of German philoso-
pher Martin Heidegger: he cites more than once from the famous essay on 
the origin of the work of art, and uses a review of William Barrett's What Is 
Existentialism? to explicate Heidegger's masterpiece Sein und Zeit. Yet Lindsay 
Waters' comment, in his very fine introduction to this book, that early de 
Man "could be seen (uncharitably, I think) as a set of variations upon a 
theme of Hegel's" is not uncharitable at all but apt (Ix). The incontestable 
conclusion the reader reaches from these essays is that de Man was a critic 
for whom the modern predicament was preeminently the legacy of Romanti-
cism (the three literary or cultural periods de Man permits himself are 
"prerornantic," "romantic," and "postromantic"), and for whom the essence of 
Romanticism was Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness. 
Contrary to the impression he sometimes fostered, de Man is not averse to 
periodizing of a certain sort. Most appropriate for these purposes is \ .. :hat he 
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says in "The Inward Generation": "If one extends the historical perspective 
[of postwar thought] far enough to include romanticism, the present-day state 
of mind appears in a much clearer light. This awareness of a deep separation 
between man's inner consciousness and the totality of what is not himself 
had certainly existed before 1800, but it becomes predominant around that 
time . ... We must remember that the inwardness of our age has its origin in 
what Hegel called the unhappy consciousness" (14-15). 
This fundamental belief is one he shares with Jean-Paul Sartre. De Man 
may give the impression in this volume of being the Frenchman's enemy 
twin. His review of Sartre's Les mots is only the most blatant attack in a 
collection whose implied interlocutor, as with Albert Camus's La chute, Sartre 
seems often to be. But he shares with the Sartre of Being and Nothingness the 
assumption that Hegel's notion of the Unhappy Consciousness, first 
broached in his Phenomenology of the Spirit, is a key text for modem Western 
thought. Briefly, the spirit in the state of unhappy consciousness is one es-
tranged from its own situation, and ultimately from itself. It seeks, this spirit, 
to escape its own inconstancy, its own "experience of a temporal order" (175), 
by seeking that which claims eternal substance: God, nature, perhaps the 
Tribe, for some moderns the destiny of History itself. 
Unhappy consciousness emerges in Heidegger as a conflict between man-
kind's nostalgia for the earth on the one hand and its striving for sky on the 
other (31). Sartre inscribes our nostalgia for nature's integrity as the yearning 
of people who must exist for themselves (pour so i) somehow to merge with 
that which only subsists in itself (en soil. De Man also writes with such pri-
mordial estrangement ever in mind, from the first essay in the collection, on 
Montaigne, where he declares "contradiction" to be "the mind's law" (11). A 
later de Man than the one writing in 1953 would perhaps have said 
"rhetoric's law" instead; but I am doubtful that what he described was ever 
much different from this. 
The value for de Man of the poetic, then, resides principally in its capacity 
to render the movement of a mind as it confronts its own limitations, and 
negotiates the mutabilities to which that timebound mind is itself subject: 
"OUf pain comes from OUI knowledge that we are temporal creatures" (73). 
The impulse behind artistic creation-in Romantics de Man favors such as 
Friedrich HOlderlin and, by extension, all true artists-is double. On the one 
hand, the poet enacts a longing for the eternal status of a sensuous object: 
"immediate being is identical with oneself, that things can be only what they 
are" (22). At the same time, in creating an object in tum, the poet hopes to 
transcend temporality and its attendant estrangement: "The resulting unbear-
able tension has to materialize into a fonn in order to be surmounted" (15). 
De Man's excellent essay "Process and Poetry" builds upon this fundamen-
tal drama to use Charles Baudelaire and Stephane MaIlarrne in order to 
"distinguish two kinds of poetic attitude: the first would be that of a poetry of 
process, maintaining itself as consciousness at the expense of the sensuous 
object [described in the poem], whereas the other would be a poetry of sub-
stance, maintaining the sensuous object at the expense of consciousness" 
(71). In other words, one poetic attitude is more nostalgic for the earth, 
whereas the other strives more mightily for the Pamassian sky, although a 
ugenuine poetics has to be able to include this oscillation" within it (idem.). 
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But the same ontological predicament accounts for both tendencies, however 
opposing: the poet's desire that "the poetic" be "a privileged action" by 
means of which "the possibility of a new innocence and of a possible future, 
beyond negation, can still be conceived" (27). It is for this reason that poetic 
creation appeals to the poet for whom "any existence within the framework 
of accepted reality can no longer satisfy him" (15). 
The poetic act is also something written down, as de Man notes in explicat-
ing a Mallarme poem: "it leave[s] a trace, the work's memory suspended in 
an ideal space and revealing that an action has occurred" (26). In addition, 
though, the poetic result is also the record of a failure. No human being can 
achieve the impassive solidity of nature, and no mortal can attain the eternal 
realm of spirit; and yet the longing for both is constitutive of the "being of 
the poetic as such" (58). On account of this inevitable failure of the poetic, 
"poetry becomes a mask, a constant dissimulating through which we attempt 
to hide from ourselves" (73). The poetic record is then both the memory of 
the artist's striving after a unity posited outside of the self and also the spirit-
ual wreckage left by the failure of such striving. We can see in this concep-
tion of poetry's "ontology" the argument in de Man's famous essay "The In-
tentional Structure of the Romantic Image," and arguably its poetics of failure 
continues to imbue that later work as well. For de Man is clear very early on 
that for him poetry teaches not by edifying but by presenting the most dra-
matic evidence of how man, in attempting a monument, achieves instead a 
ruin. In the passage above comparing poetry to a mask, de Man goes on to 
clarify the sort of value judgment he draws from this comparison: "This is a 
form neither of weakness nor of hypocrisy in Western poetry, but rather its 
profoundest necessity" (idem.). It is a necessity of a "poetry" that he defines 
as "the putting into language of the failure of the true to found itself" (66). 
Without embarking on an exegesis of Allegories of Reading or The Rhetoric of 
Romanticism, I would assert that, in its essentials, that is the story he contin-
ues to tell-of spiritual striving and, above all, of spiritual failure-right up 
to the end. 
De Man is surely not unaware that language is also an intersubjective, 
even an anthropological matter, not just an ontological one. But it is fair to 
say that de Man sees this sort of awareness as secondary to the central drama 
of his unhappy consciousness. He emphatically tells us that retrieving "the 
autonomy of the literary work ... from the onslaughts of crudely determinis-
tic systems" has been the "great contribution of New Criticism" (110), and 
Waters properly points to his frequent gibes at so-called action intellectuals of 
the Andre Malraux type. It pleases de Man that in Keats' Fall of Hyperion, 
"the sacrificial act of historical commitment" is one in which the poet himself 
does not join. "[TJhe poet is merely the one who has seen the sacrifice/ thus 
assuring that the "role of the poet" is ··distinct from that of the Savior" (57). 
(He likes Keats' allegory of sacrifice and witness so well that he invokes it 
again later on, by way of lecturing a renegade Harold Bloom [95J.) The en-
gage intellectual of the 'thirties and 'forties, whose stance he knew well (hav-
ing at least briefly struck a comparable pose himself), was an affront to his 
concern v·lith "inwardness," whereas Waters points out he follows Maurice 
Blanchot rather than Sartre (xxx-xl). 
One begins, in reading these essays, to understand why, when he moves 
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away from earlier emphases, de Man goes in the direction not of rejecting 
inwardness for intersubjectivity, but of rejecting metaphors of the mind for 
figures of rhetoric. Even the psychologistic potential of the unhappy con-
sciousness is one he chooses not to explore; indeed, his horror of the psy-
choanalytic rivals his distaste for the sociological. Clearly, one of the worst 
sins in his bill of particulars against Sartre's Les mots is that it is "an act of 
self-therapy that, as such [that condign phrase again], does not belong to 
literature" (122). He then goes on-oddly, given that those veteran self-ther-
apists Proust and Rousseau are among the examples-to counterpose other 
"writers [who] have been concerned with interpreting, and not with curing, 
their own predicament" (idem.). The distinction may seem without a differ-
ence to some readers, but it does not prevent de Man from pronouncing 
Sartre that most damned of specimens, "an unliterary man" (118). 
It is less interesting whether de Man's judgment upon Sartre is considered 
and just (to be honest, I suspect it to be neither) than what are the grounds 
on which he seems to stand in making it. He makes a similar complaint 
against Andre Gide for sullying the purity of the literary by a preoccupation 
with his erotic identity: to Gide's bad example (which de Man fears for its ef-
fects less on the morals of youth than on the practice of literature) he coun-
terposes Valery and Rilke, whose "long explorations ... have to do with the 
nature of poetic language rather than with interpersonal relations" (136). It is 
as if "interpersonal relations" were the tawdriest sort of thing imaginable, es-
pecially when compared to "poetic language." 
Definitely one confronts in de Man a critic who sees any recognition of the 
particulars of human psychology, history or cultural identity as merely a bar-
rier to the accession of consciousness to the essential contradictions that are 
the mind's law. As with the project of his guru Heidegger, de Man's ontolog-
ical concern with the spirit and its quest for authentic being is forever threat-
ened by the looming shadows of the merely "ontic," or thinglike, concerns of 
the petty everyday world. Even Heidegger, much as he seems not to know 
quite what to do with it, includes Mit-Sein, or "being-with" other people, as 
one of the doorways to his fundamental ontology. But de Man treats interest 
in society in any mode as on a par with nostalgia for brute Nature: "When 
[political] systems claim their ability to solve ... problems, they are in fact 
appealing to a temptation that exists in all of us: a desire for serenity that 
tries to forget and to repress the original anxiety [of unhappy consciousness]" 
(15). Insofar as he treats such matters at all in his earlier writings, he progres-
sively flees any such "anthropologism" as he proceeds, until finally any at-
tempt to connect the linguistic with any "outside/' however defined, becomes 
deluded aesthetic ideology. 
Waters is right to align de Man "with those who had been seeking since 
the 1930s to understand interiority in an impersonal sense" (xxxvii). What 
psychological features de Man permits are there, it seems, primarily as heu-
ristic means to grasp the invariant antinomies of our temporal being: time it-
self is our eternal predicament, whether this entails (as in early de Man) the 
failure of poetic intention to found its own truth or (as in later de Man) the 
inability of language to coincide with itself. As with Heidegger, this 
"temporality" is itself a transcendent category. In other words, it is not sub-
ject to empirical flux: the temporal is decidedly not historical here. It leads 
i 
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one to suspect that the inwardness de Man posits as that which we all flee 
rather than face up to ourselves gradually becomes the inwardness of lan-
guage "as such," into which he himself is able to flee in order precisely to es-
cape an "outside" in which he is all too entangled. 
It is perhaps inevitable to read the essays herein collected in the light of 
the posthumous (for most) revelations about the author's early collaboration-
ist writings for Le Soir at the outset of World War Two. And indeed, some of 
his arguments solicit the reader's cautious consideration in light of the recent 
controversy. Foremost among them would have to be his 1966 essay entitled 
"The Literature of Nihilism." 
The occasion for his remarks is the publication of books by Erich Heller 
and Ronald Gray on the German literary tradition. Much of the essay is de-
voted to defending German culture against the charge that it led to the Nazi 
era. After first making the obvious point that the Nazi movement was chiefly 
populist rather than intellectual in origin, de Man proceeds to make a curious 
claim: "The problem is not that a philosophical tradition could be so wrong 
but that it could have counted for so little when it was most needed. The re-
sponsibility [for Nazism] rests not with the tradition but with the manner in 
which if was used or neglected, and this is primarily a sociological problem" 
(163). 
I pass over the clear implication that a proper understanding of the Ger-
man philosophical tradition would have hindered the rise of Nazism, to say 
nothing of the way the neglect of this tradition at the crucial hour (by whom? 
It is unspecified) is relegated to the presumably subordinate status of a 
"sociological problem." (Seldom has the abdication of Germany's intellectual 
class before Hitler been put more primly in its place.) He does assert that for 
him, it "is not in the power of philosophy or literature to prevent the degra-
dation of the human spirit," nor is its job to "warn against' this degradation" 
(164). He clarifies this idea as follows: "This does not mean that philosophers 
and poets have no moral or political responsibility even when their work is 
apolitical. But it means this responsibility should be evaluated within the full 
philosophical or literary context of their work, not their lives, still less the ef-
fect that their work mayor may not have had on other people" (164). 
The phrasing of de Man's disavowal is ambiguous at the least. Is it because 
one cannot discern the precise effect of someone's work on "other people" 
that such a criterion cannot be used to judge them? Or because considering 
the effect of such work on others for any reason is itself some sort of imper-
tinence, an ethical overreaching? However read, this reluctance not merely 
oneself to judge but even to permit others to hazard judgment in the name of 
anything beyond the "context of the work" is of a piece with de Man's early 
and consistent horror of the intersubjective sphere, indeed of history in gen-
eral. "True wisdom," he says, claiming only to be explicating HOlderlin, 
"begins in the knowledge of its own historical ineffectiveness" (212). Yet 
even if this quietistic viewpoint is valid (a dubious assumption), the stridency 
of tone with which de Man promulgates it in response to Gray and Heller 
bespeaks a fear lest the inwardness of a writer's work not be respected. Even 
de Man's late use of the notion of the "performative" aspect of language can 
be seen as a way of placing the "responsibility" for language's effects-on 
language itself and not its users. At that point, not even a work's 
"philosophical or literary context" indicates its author's responsibility. 
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Such a question returns the reader to those few sections where de Man 
confronts the interpersonal and the historical. When he does, his attitude 
looks rather different from Heidegger's Mit-Sein. He speaks, as if with 
mounting distaste, of "those semi-herdlike reactions of shapeless impulse, 
sometimes generous, always gregarious, which make up human behavior in 
times of collective crisis," He adds that writers such as Malraux, where "a 
masochistic anti-intellectualism causes this abdication of the mind," follow 
"the typical pattern from political activism, to an avowed antihistoricism and 
to a nihilistic conservatism" (16). It takes a de Man to see activism as the nec-
essary progenitor of nihilistic conservatism; but in Malraux's case, he discerns 
someone who has entered the field of action for much the same reason other 
Frenchmen are said to join the Foreign Legion: "as a protection that shielded 
them from their real problems" (14). Therefore, once the nostalgie de la boue 
of activism proves ineffectual, the person reacts by retreating into the 
"fatigue" of which elsewhere he accuses Malraux (33). 
The great sin of figures such as Malraux-the "abdication" he assails-is 
the reverse of the abdication he defends in his review of Heller and Gray. 
Here the abdication is of the life of the mind in favor of some notion of the 
political: the capitulation to shapeless impulse, as insidious in its generous 
guise, evidently, as in its merely gregarious. The ethically charged language 
with its imputation of psychic aberration shows de Man again in an un-
usually harsh mode. To what could one ascribe these perturbations of the 
critical spirit? 
De Man's defense of the German tradition and his attack on Malraux's po-
litical engagement share two important features: both passages treat the ef-
fect of writing and politics on each other, and more specifically both take 
World War Two as their governing instance. The fuller context of his remarks 
on Malraux makes this clear, as does its position within the· "Inward 
Generation" essay whose topic is intellectual life since the war. It may signify 
that having begun an article about the intellectual situation following the 
war, de Man proceeds to attribute the alienation of the 'fifties intellectuals 
not to the war at all but to the inheritance of romanticism. This is the place 
where the year 1800 is brought in, although the years 1939-45 get short 
shrift. Clearly de Man prefers to diagnose the inwardness of his generation as 
flowing not from some crisis within the life of "interpersonal relationsN or 
their political forms but rather from the metaphysical situation of the mind, a 
metaphysical estrangement whose romantic phase he feels we are all still in. 
This is not the place to claim he is wrong. But de Man's haste to attribute a 
fairly specific cultural sensibility to unhappy consciousness betokens an im-
patience with historical contingency, and an almost breathtaking capacity to 
evade the traumatic events of his own recent past, and that of his generation. 
The impatience and the evasion have a certain logic, to be sure. They 
doubtless go a long way toward understanding why de Man views outward 
action as betrayal of the mind rather than objectification of the mind's con-
cerns (he does not follow Hegel this far, evidently). Again, de Man clearly 
explicates more than Holderlin when he writes about "the transitory nature 
of all historical achievement, about the difficulty for the mind to maintain its 
balance in view of the ceaseless erosion of the historical world [why only er-
osion? is history not also made?], and about poetry as a medium in which 
some degree of lucidity can prevail" (212). 
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But it is also fair to surmise that were it not for de Man's own hesitancy in 
confronting this recent event, his thought might have been less able to forego 
so much of the richness that comes from contextualizing the works of culture, 
and perhaps more skeptical of a method that moves so swiftly from the par-
ticulars of a work's historical setting and concerns (all of those "socio-
logical problems") in order to pave the way for yet another ontological mo-
rality play. (It may matter less than some de Manians think that the drama tis 
personae change from Time and Consciousness to Grammar and Rhetoric: the 
drama itself endures.) 
The claim made for de Man by so many of his disciples that his critique 
shows exemplary rigor is no doubt true; and part of the rigor lies in the pessi-
mism itself, his refusal to end the soul's torment by positing a heaven other 
than fictional for unhappy consciousness to seek. Like every inheritor of Ro-
manticism, de Man understands that Enlightenment alone was never enough; 
but to his credit he is never compelled to conclude that something else there-
fore is. Still, the rigor of his concem-a constant demonstration from differ-
ent angles of what he considered the nature of the literary-is bought at a 
price. It is undeniable that his conception of the properly poetic project has 
scarcely more room for humankind than for God or Nature. Put another way, 
God and Nature, neither of which is attainable by the poet, are both still 
more crucial to de Man's rendition of the literary act than is the intersubjec-
tive sphere. 
It is, again, less a question of whether de Man's mode of depicting literary 
art is true. Unquestionably, for me there is much truth in the drama he en-
acts, with all its variations. The more interesting problem is why (apart from 
his training in the Romantics, that is) he finds this drama the overriding one, 
to the exclusion of socio-, psycho-, or anthropological concerns? Even though 
he does not eschew social or political action as being significant to poetry, he 
sees it solely as a threat to the mind's lucidity, as a snare and a delusion. The 
intersubjective sphere, which Heidegger and Hegel before him put some-
where within the realm of spirit, de Man banishes to the extraliterary hinter-
lands. When he attacks easy representatives of political action such as Hem-
ingway, for whom being engage meant "liberating" the Ritz just before the 
Allies did, one sees his point. Further, de Man's edginess at imputing 
"organicist" national characteristics to texts is understandable: it is not an ap-
proach that led to happy results in his own early journalism. But to most crit-
ics working now, and certainly to me, the foreswearing of any attempt to in-
vestigate a work of art as if it came from a country, a society, or even a fam-
ily looks willfully narrow: "rigorous" perhaps, but in an unflattering sense. 
As de Man would be the first to point out, the possibility (which I think 
probable) that his way of defining the literary was in part a defensive reac-
tion to his experience with the larger, scarier realm of political actions and 
consequences does not make the definition incorrect. However, he is willing 
to treat data such as language and the poetic act as if they were not manifes-
tations of human social agency, when obviously they are; and one has the 
right to establish whether what is gained in the way of metaphysical rigor is 
worth forgetting about a work's social context in order to concentrate solely 
upon the poem's dialogue with its own soul, its own mortality, or its lan-
guage "as such." De Man's hastiness to endorse this "ontological" view of all 
c 
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literary activity should not keep the reader from seeing the other textual di-
mensions he is declaring out of bounds. It is likely that his own experience of 
history, not to mention the role he himself played in it, made him seek a 
realm which lacked the messy compromises of the great world. 
The nostalgia of the Romantics for ancient Greece, which he notes several 
times, anticipates the allegorical ruin he invokes in his later writings, after 
"The Rhetoric of Temporality." Unlike those who saw their philo-Hellenism 
as the Romantics' belief that this world could be recaptured, de Man with 
Walter Benjamin comprehends that the "neo-Hellenic theme is for the ro-
mantics a special version of the theme of mutability and contingency, not the 
description of an actual state of being that could be brought back if we only 
had the strength to do so" (169). Perhaps de Man's never-wavering faith in 
the literary was something like the Romantics' love of ancient Greece: the 
longing for a space where he could reside uncompromised by the things of 
everyday human life and history. Perhaps, for all its anguish and failure, the 
literary drama nourished his unhappy consciousness in a way that the great 
world (which was in fact not distant from de Man but far too much with 
him) never could. Perhaps the literary "as such" was finally his salvific fic-
tion; and too late one begins to see just what it would have had to save him 
from. 
De Man mentions at one point how "certain writers" achieve notoreity 
"because they can be easily turned into examples behind which we hide our 
own shortcomings. Rimbaud's decision to stop writing, for example, provides 
a fine pretext to those who were never able even to begin" (131). When I saw 
this I laughed, but brought myself up short. What if this diagnostically in-
clined review were to do the same for its readers? Could the example of de 
Man's collaborationism give a pretext to "abandon" a study of his work to 
people either unable or unwilling to undertake it? For as I said at the outset, 
the critical landscape is already far different from the one for which, as late 
as a decade ago, literariness was still a central issue. De Man's project, what-
ever its motivations, is one of the most thoroughgoing attempts to define the 
literary (which was for him the poetic) activity. At such time as the propo-
nents of a newer, more anthropologically informed approach to cultural cri-
tique (whose number no doubt includes this reviewer) decide to try to institu-
tionalize this approach as the guiding one, and not merely another amusing 
way to "do criticism," they will not be able for very long to ignore the cri-
tique implicit in de Man's project, any more than his project (and, yes, his life 
and his effect on other people) will be able to avoid them. 
Ohio State University Mark Conroy 
----I 
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Milton and the Drama of History: Historical Vision, Iconoclasm, and the Literary 
Imagination by David Loewenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990. Pp. x + 197. $34.50. 
David Loewenstein's book offers "a study of the figuration of history in 
Milton's revolutionary prose and major poems" (1). By the phrase "figuration 
of history" Loewenstein means primarily the ways in which history is figured 
or represented in Milton's writings; he does not mean, for the most part, the 
ways in which history itself might possess the figurational power to "author" 
Milton or his work. While Loewenstein traces Milton's double career as poet 
and prose controversialist against the unfolding of political and cultural 
events, his book is predominantly formalist in method, focusing on the com-
plex literary and conceptual construction of history in Milton's writings. Hay-
den White's theories on the literary "emplotment" of historical narrative pro-
vide Loewenstein with a means of articulating literary genre with historical 
process. Throughout, the book emphasizes Milton's turbulent, divided, and 
often tragic sense of history, and highlights Milton's (often frustrated or pes-
simistic) sense of the ways in which his own writing might intervene in or 
transform the course of English history during the pre- to post-revolutionary 
eras. 
Chapter One, "The Drama of History in the Early Revolutionary Prose: 
sets the tone for much of what follows in a study of the five antiprelatical 
tracts that Milton published in 1641 and 1642. Loewenstein traces the influ-
ence of radical millenarian thought, as instanced in the work of apocalyptic 
commentators Thomas Brightman and Joseph Mede, on Milton's vision of 
history. This millennialist strain, argues Loewenstein, imbues Of Reformation, 
Animadversions, and The Reason of Church-Government with their aspiration 
toward complete and imminent Reformation. Yet at the same time, Milton is 
plagued by a contrasting sense of Christian history as a tragic narrative of 
prelatical backsliding. Images of diseased or disfigured bodies figure the spir-
itual and political degeneration of England in these early tracts, and reflect an 
antagonism between millenial expectation and historical frustration that fuels 
Milton's virulently iconoclastic, antiprelatical rhetoric. 
The follovnng two chapters, on Areopagitica and Eikolloklasfes respectively, 
further develop these themes. Areopagitica addresses Parliament as the 
hoped-for historical agent of Reformation. Milton depicts the recovery of di-
vine Truth as attainable only through the continual friction of "neighboring 
differences," not through a forced unifonnity of opinion imposed by prelati-
cal government, and he attempts to waken the members of Parliament to 
their revolutionary work in fostering this ongoing production of difference. 
Eikolloklastes similarly emphasizes the role of discord and discontinuity in 
Reformation, as it tries to demolish both the idolatrous images generated by 
the "martyrdom" of Charles I and the conservative vision of history, 
grounded in the continuous lines of monarchy and episcopacy, v.,hich this 
royalist iconography tried to reinforce. Milton accomplishes his iconoclastic 
work not simply by destroying the king's image but by imaginatively reform-
ing or "'re-emplotting'" the materials of royal propaganda, so that Charles ap-
pears no longer as tragic hero but as figure in a satirical anti-masque. Chapter 
Four, on the later revolutionary prose, traces Milton's growing pessimism to-
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wards his reformational and iconoclastic project as he becomes increasingly 
alienated from an English nation which seems on the brink of relapsing into 
monarchy and prelacy. 
The final two chapters of the book turn from Milton's prose to his poetry, 
yet repeatedly emphasize the continuities between them. Chapter Five looks 
at Michael's presentation of future history in Books XI and XII of Paradise 
Lost and finds there the same tensions that characterize Milton's vision from 
the time of the early antiprelatical prose-tensions, that is, between a linear 
and progressive narrative of history and a merely circular, repetitive, and 
tragic one. Loewenstein successfully argues against any easily optimistic 
reading of human history in Paradise Lost, insisting that the tragic elements of 
Michael's presentation cannot simply be subsumed or cancelled by a typolog-
ical or salvational progression. 
The sixth and final chapter, on Samson Agonistes, sums up the themes de-
veloped in the book thus far. Samson both embodies the frustrations that in-
here in Milton's divided vision of history and fashions a final, iconoclastic, 
yet theatrical response to them. Loewenstein reads Samson as a II displaced 
and tragic version of the heroic national poem that [Milton 1 had hoped to 
write" (132), and finds in Samson's confrontations with Dalila and Harapha 
an image of the polemical Milton of the prose tracts. 
The major virtue of Loewenstein's book is its ability to trace a set of con-
tinuing historical concerns throughout Milton's career and to draw valuable 
connections between the poetry and the prose. Sometimes these connections 
take the form of over arching thematic patterns, and sometimes they concern 
more local but interesting details. For instance, Loewenstein suggestively jux-
taposes the vision of the lazar-house in Paradise Lost XI, 477-93, with the 
images of a diseased body politic that appear in the early prose tracts. Or 
again, he reads Michael's narrative of Nimrod (Paradise Lost XII, 24-62) 
against Milton's use of Nimrod as an image of prelatical power in Animadver-
sions and Eikonoklastes. 
While such internal connections are useful, however, they also tend to fos-
ter a conception of Milton's writings as largely self-enclosed. Despite Loew-
enstein's intention to demonstrate Milton's troubled interventions in the his-
torical arena, his formalist approach has the effect of reducing history to just 
another literary "theme" or topic. To be sure, Milton's writings are placed in 
an historical context, but Milton himself is conceived of as an autonomous, if 
morally and politically engaged, subject-one who grapples with the 
"problem" of history but who is not himself either constrained or produced 
by social forces. A more dialectical sense of historical agency, one in which 
subject and historical field are mutually constitutive, might have produced a 
study whose virtues were less "fugitive and cloistered." 
Indeed, the book is largely vitiated by it own intellectual timidity. While it 
is certainly well-informed on matters historical, it gives no sense that the pe-
riod it discusses has been the subject of especially intense debate in recent 
years. Loewenstein resolutely avoids any detailed reading of Milton's histori-
calor social situation, a decision which inevitably renders his sense of Mil-
ton's "response" to that situation rather abstract. The book eschews any theo-
retical commitments as well; despite the occasional reference to Hayden 
White, its approach is basically new-critical and formalist. Of course, Loew-
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enstein states from the outset that he intends to read Milton's literary figura-
tions of history; hence it is unfair to berate him for not having written the 
kind of book he had no intention of writing. Furthermore, a close if restricted 
study of "the interplay between historical consciousness and literary expres-
sion, political vision and textual effects" (2) is a necessary prelude to any his-
torical reading of Milton-missing, for instance, from Christopher Hill's oth-
erwise masterful studies. Unfortunately, Loewenstein doesn't succeed very 
well even on his own terms, because his readings aren't especially incisive or 
bold. As a result, nothing in the way of a new or provocative interpretation 
of Milton emerges from this study, which is notable more for its diligence 
than for its originality. 
University of Colorado, Boulder Richard Halpern 
A Form of Sound Words: The Religious Poetry of Christopher Smart by Harriet 
Guest. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. 312. $69.00, cloth; $55.20, paper. 
Harriet Guest's A Form of Sound Words: The Religious Poetry of Christopher 
Smart is a major addition to the modest but expanding body of significant 
work on Smart. Like Patricia M. Spacks' The Poetry of Vision (1967), A Form 
of Sound Words helps us better to situate Smart in a poetic milieu; like Chris-
topher Devlin's Poor Kit Smart (1961), Arthur Sherbo's Christopher Smart: 
Scholar of the University (1967), and Moira Dearnley's The Poetry of Christo-
pher Smart (1968), Guest's book attempts a synoptic view of Smart's literary 
career; and, like earlier important articles by W. H. Bond,. W. M. Merchant, 
Robert Fitzgerald, and A. D. Hope, it helps us better to understand Smart's 
aggressively experimental poetic form in Jubilate Agno. Finally, A Form of 
Sound Words, like more recent articles by Geoffrey Hartman, Alan Liu, and 
William Kurnbier, demonstrates the fruitfulness with which new critical ap-
proaches and vocabulary can be brought to bear on Smart's challenging reli-
gious poetry. 
The heart of A Form of Sound Words-the difference it makes to scholarship 
in approach and emphasis-is three central chapters on Smart's book-length 
poem Jubilate Agno, much of which was -written during Smart's confinement 
for supposed madness. Guest's unusual focus on the Jubilate bolsters her call 
for a reappraisal of Smart's poetry. Where previous critics have often treated 
Jubilate Agno as, at best, preparation for the more widely known "A Song to 
David," Guest devotes her most sustained critical attention to Smart's noto-
rious "mad" poem. Her prolonged focus seems to imply-accurately, in my 
view-that Smart's future reputation way well depend on Jubilate Agno as 
much as, if not more than, on "A Song to David." Guest emphasizes that the 
Jubilate has many continuities with Smart's previous work, pointedly avoid-
ing the mythic narrative of Smart's development as a sudden change from 
merely ingenious poetaster before-that is, before supposed madness-to 
lightning-struck genius and culture-hero after. 
The introductory chapter of A Form of Sound Words takes up the poetic 
problem of representing God's creation in an increasingly scientific and phil-
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osophical age. The poetic problem is, as Guest argues, that "the systematiza-
tion of variety as order may be incompatible with religious reverence" (41). 
This formulation-precise and useful, if not startlingly original-allows 
Guest to place Smart along a spectrum that moves from poetic system-build-
ers to poetic explorers. Smartf firmly in the explorers' camp, can be seen as 
helping to invent a new kind of poetic voice and function: 
Smart defines the role of the religious poet as the reviver of adoration 
in England, as the prophetic psalmist of a sense of national identity 
that collapses the distinctions between high and low, polite and vulgar. 
But the ambitious attempt his poetry represents, to unify and address a 
mixed congregation of the faithful, demands that it create a new audi-
ence for itself .... (67) 
It is the sustained focus on the poet's role and relations with a mostly imagi-
nary audience that makes Guest's three chapters on Jubilate Agna the first at-
tempt at a full-scale reading of the poem. 
Chapter 2 gives the most detailed reading we have yet had of the early 
odes Smart wrote for a university prize at Cambridge. Already, as Guest 
shows, Smart is finding his way towards a disjunctive "poetry of exploration" 
that begins to redefine the poet's cultural role. Guest's concluding chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that Smart's revised notion of the poet's role should 
also be central to our grasp of his "A Song to David" and his Hymns and Spir-
itual Songs. 
A Form of Sound Words, while making its broader argument, intervenes cru-
cially in the question of the editorial arrangement of Jubilate Agna. Guest 
shows that the recent and presumably authoritative Clarendon edition of Jub-
ilate Agna cannot supersede the older standard edition by W. H. Bond. In-
deed, Guest makes clear that the Clarendon edition does considerable vio-
lence to the Jubilate. In the Bond edition, the poem can be read in two direc-
tions at once, as if it were a cross-word puzzle. Reading horizontally across 
two facing pages, one sees connections between "antiphonally" related lines 
beginning with the words "Let" and "For." Reading vertically, one likewise 
sees a formal and thematic parallelism connecting one "Let" line to the next. 
In Karina Williamson's edition for Clarendon, one reads down only, from 
one vertically paired doublet of "Let:For" lines to the next. This arrangemeT'lt, 
as Guest points out, effectively eclipses the crucial parallelism between tile 
"Let" lines, obliterating an entire dimension of the poem. Guest's emphasis 
on the connection between the "Let" lines eventually pays off with a fresh 
way of seeing the whole poem, including the argument that we may not be 
missing as many fragments of it as has hitherto been assumed. 
The methodology of A Form of Sound Words seems, at first glance, to be a 
very traditional sort of historical background study. However, since Guest co-
authored an article that appears in the polemically titled The New Eighteenth 
Century: Theory, Politics, English Literature [(ed. Felicity Nussbaum and Laura 
Brown (New York and London, 1987)], she appears to be engaged in subtle 
negotiations with the new scholarship. And A Form of Sound Words is in fact 
best described as a subtle blending of traditional and "new" historicism. 
Many of the book's liveliest points revolve around a vocabulary that includes 
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such terms as "appropriation" (50), "demystification" (32), "destabilization" 
(27), and "negotiation" (4). Pope's Essay on Man, for instance, "cuts the 
ground from under its own feet by destabilizing the terms of reason, right, 
and argument on which its success depends" (27). Such terms, however un-
obtrusively used, belong to the vocabulary of the newer historical scholar-
ship. 
Certain conspicuous absences, it must be said, point to a conservative ele-
ment in Guest's approach. For one thing, the whole problematic of Smart's 
"madness" -the meanings the eighteenth century gave to madness, the way 
confinement might have conditioned his poetry-is simply evaded. In her 
firm repudiation of the so-called biographical fallacy-often egregiously re-
ductive in Smart studies-Guest unfortunately narrows and reduces the no-
tion of culture operating in her theme of the poet's "cultural role," Guest also 
omits from her analyses of religious discourse many of its connections to the 
antagonistic political histories, including a civil war, in which it has been 
enmeshed. It is hard to think of a more complacent way to discuss class op-
pression than in the genteel terms of a contrast between the "polite" and the 
"vulgar." 
The most conservative element of all in Guest's approach-her playing 
down, at every tum, of Smart's eccentricity-surely has effects that she does 
not intend. Guest clearly wishes to avoid the betrayal of Smart's poem by 
means of an arrogant medical language that defines social deviance as mad 
"Otherness." The danger she fails to recognize is that an overly familiar lan-
guage of "Sameness" may likewise betray the poem's disruptive qualities, its 
rough edges. She scarcely acknowledges the distance between the sobriety of 
her own prose and the fantastically pun-laden, alternately hilarious and ec-
static poem that Smart wrote. The scandalous audacity of his intellectual 
project-an attempt, as a second "David" or "Ezra," to rewrite the Anglican 
liturgy-hardly seems to make her blink. There is a serious danger that her 
discussion of the Jubilate tends to tame it, to assimilate it too easily to a bland 
and bloodless normality. Far from redeeming Smart's text, moreover, such an 
insufficiently earned domestication of its actual strangeness in effect reduces 
its interest and value. Her formidably researched book can leave one with the 
final impression that the Jubilate is a rather ordinary poem composed under 
rather ordinary circumstances: hardly the reappraisal the poem's originality 
deserves. 
Many of Smart's critics have not been eager to spell out the ambiguous po-
litical and religious affiliations of his revisionary project. Guest's recuperation 
of Smart's difficult strangeness, as with several previous critics, takes a High 
Church coloring. In Guest's case, we are repeatedly informed that Smart's 
"apparent unorthodoxy" (103) poses no real difficulty for seeing him as a 
staunch Anglican. Thus the fact that Smart wrote in the Dissenting genre of 
hymns-and even hymns focused on the evangelical concept of "Grace" -is 
explained away, with a certain embarrassment, in the final chapter. That cer-
tain strains in Jubilate Agno indubitably recall 17th-century "enthusiastic" sec-
'\ tarians is simply not discussed. Smart's Quakerish wish to reform the 
"pagan' names of the days of the week and his Adamite praise of dancing 
naked in the rain, to name only a couple of blatant examples, link Smart's 
poem to seventeenth-century discourses that cannot easily be termed 
\ ·o""o'~.· 
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A Form of Sound Words, if not the last word on Smart, is one of the best so 
far. Any student of Smart will welcome the provocation of Harriet Guest's 
work on a poet whose reputation her important book further enhances. A 
Form of Sound Words belongs on the shelf of any library where literature is 
studied. 
Southern Illinois University Clement Hawes 
Keats's Poetry and the Politics of the Imagination by Daniel P. Watkins. Cran-
bury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses. 1989. Pp. 228 $36.50. 
Through the years Keats's poetry has proven notoriously resistant to his-
torical criticism. With the exception of a few tentative forays (which seem to 
appear every two decades or so: see Thorpe [PMLA, 1931]; Ward [PQ, 1955]; 
and Koch [JEGP, 1972]), Keats studies has been much more taken with lan-
guage and psychology than with history or politics. If there have been at-
tempts to contextualize the poetry, they have been in terms of words rather 
than worlds; Keats scholarship is rich in influence studies, in essays that trace 
and cross-trace literary echoes and borrowings. Indeed, critics have labored 
to situate Keats, as he himself wished, "among the English Poets." Helen 
Vendler's massively detailed The Odes of John Keats (1983), however, seemed 
at once to mark the apotheosis and prefigure the doom of the aesthetic 
school. One felt, in reading Vendler's Odes, that she had exhausted the Keats 
of sensuous effect and verbal dazzle. Emerging from hyper-explication, the 
odes appeared depleted, wan, like the knight at the end of La Belle Dame Sans 
Merci. What more had they to offer? More importantly, perhaps, what more 
could we find? "Vendler's critique," as MarjOrie Levinson observes in her 
own recent book on Keats, "leaves no rift unfilled" (30). 
It was not until the "Keats and Politics" issue of Studies in Romanticism 
(Summer, 1986) that the subject of history was again revived, partly because 
of the critical climate, the renewed sympathy with historical approaches, but 
partly, I think, because of Helen Vendler. The "Keats and Politics" issue, 
along with the two most recent full length treatments of the poetry-Levin-
son's Keats's Life of Allegory (1988) and now Watkins's book-constitute a 
persuasive and timely reaction to Vendler's totalizing study. Moreover, they 
are both transitionary works that experiment not only with new approaches 
to Keats, but with new languages for critical inquiry. In this sense, both rep-
resent a revolution in Keats studies and should promote a welcome and 
lively debate. 
Whereas Levinson is nothing if not forthcoming and self-conscious about 
her role as subversive (liThe doctrinal insults are obvious and need no 
explaining" (37)), Watkins is always polite and apologetic, sometimes exces-
sively so: "Without denying the importance of these interpretive problems, 
and without questioning the very real contributions of critical efforts to come 
to terms with them, I want to stress that previous critical focus has been 
largely centered on the text ... " (136). One of the phrases that runs through 
the book like a motif, in fact, is "This is not to say." Where Levinson is often 
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impetuous and brilliantly (if alarmingly) rude, Watkins is always calm and 
diplomatic. 
Despite their obvious differences in strategy and style, however, both 
studies are inexorably shaped by Vendler's book. Neither examines the odes, 
and Levinson avoids them expressly because of Vendler (to be sure, Watkins 
devotes a chapter to the Grecian Urn, but in isolation). One of the weak-
nesses of Keats's Poetry and the Politics of the Imagination, in fact, is its failure 
to confront Vendler or the critical problems raised by her work or that of the 
other Harvard Keatsians. Its primary strength is that in place of a poetic in-
fluence study it offers an historical one. Watkins's Keats is shown to be a 
poet who relies more heavily than we had imagined on reference works like 
Robertson's History of America, Lempriere's Classical Dictionary, Tooke's The 
Pantheon, and John Brand's Observations on the Popular Antiquities of Great 
Britain. One of the unspoken premises of Watkins's book is that Keats spent 
more time reading The Examiner than reading Milton and Shakespeare, or at 
least that he might have been more influenced by what he read in Hunt's pe-
riodical than what he found in Cowden Clarke's library. 
If he is less aggressive than Levinson in challenging the assumptions be-
hind the critical literature on Keats, or interrogating our commitment to the 
aesthetic Keats, Watkins is by no means unaware of the place of his study in 
the current reassessment of the poet's work, as he points out in the acknowl-
edgements and preface (regrettably, Levinson's book appeared too late for 
him to engage it). He is also conscious of Jerome McGann's warnings in The 
Romantic Ideology (1983) that we should resist becoming too enthralled by 
romanticism's own definitions of itself: "More often than not we unquestion-
ingly accept the poet's own self-representations and fail to consider that the 
very intensity of his statements and the degree of his commitment in certain 
poems to a transhistorical ideal might be a desperate response to the pres-
sures descending on him from the world he inhabited" (9). His aim instead is 
to shift critical focus from "poetic consciousness to the political unconscious 
of poetry" (10). By employing what he calls a "historical materialist criticism," 
(11) Watkins attempts to show how Keats's formulations of aesthetic cate-
gories like beauty and truth are caught up in a complex relationship of histor-
ical conditions and assumptions. What is interesting here is that Watkins de-
scribes a Keats ridden with historical (rather than psycholOgical) anxiety, a 
Keats who both criticizes and at times succumbs to the prevailing ideological 
forms of industrial capitalism. 
In this light, Watkins reads the extreme individualism and subjectivity of 
Keats's poetry as "a sign of the bourgeois fragmentation of human life" (25). 
The breakdown of preindustrial and agrarian forces helps spawn a nostalgic 
view of the past and of nature and is at least partially responsible for what 
Watkins calls Keats's "poetry of consolation" (37). In Endymion, for example, 
the poet constructs a quest for redemptive individual power as a response to 
social disintegration. This entails the active denial of the communal world 
portrayed in Book I and the ensuing sacrifice of history, society, and women 
for the designs of the private self. Much is "elided" (a word Watkins often in-
vokes) in other poems as well: in Isabella, the relations of production and 
human experience under capitalism; in Hyperion, "the true complexity of the 
social and historical conflict that threatens the Titans" (97); in Lamia, the real-
c 
410 Criticism, Vol. XXXIII, No.3: Book Reviews -----i 
!ties of existence in a market economy; and in Ode on a Greczan Urn just 
about everything: history, politics, imperialism, the oppression of women, 
rape, and the despoliation of Greece. 
A large portion of Watkins's argument rests on precisely such a poetics of 
elision-so much so, in fact, that we are reminded of Wallace Stevens's snow 
man, as we behold the "Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is." 
This is not at all to disparage his investigations, but simply to note what is a 
recurring problem in this work as well as in others of the new historicist 
movement (though I hesitate to locate Watkins's work in this school because 
much of his analysis harkens back to Christopher Caudwell and the early 
British Marxists, and remains largely unravished by the structuralist and se-
miotic upheavals of the '80's): namely, the degree to which we can establish 
a connection between history and poetics. Is it appropriate or necessary to 
hold every poem historically accountable? Should we not draw distinctions 
between selectivity and elision? To be more specific here, although it is 
clearly important to recognize that the assumptions about beauty and truth in 
Ode on a Grecian Urn are patriarchat is it fair to say that a ucritical 
excavation" of the poem "expose[s] the bones of the dead and the blood of 
the beaten" (119)? Or that we can appropriate the poem "for purposes of ex-
posing human atrocity"? To argue this may be to overstate the case for an 
historical approach, especially if we realize that patriarchal values are just as 
embattled as feminine ones in the ode: after all, the marble men never do 
"ravish" the maidens, and the feminized urn not only "can[st] thus express / 
A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme," but pronounces the last words 
in the poem. 
I take issue with these points only because I believe Keats's Poetry and the 
Politics of the Imagination is an important book and will need to be discussed 
and debated at greater length. Watkins is at his best when elaborating Keats's 
sources and when examining the ways in which gender figures prominently 
in such poems as Lamia, The Eve of St. Agnes, and Ode on a Grecian Urn. The 
book's meditations on Keats's use and misuse of history are also provocative, 
but need to be more specifically located in the exact circumstances of the pe-
riod 1815-1820. That is to say, at times the Marxist machinery of Watkins's 
argument looms too large and Keats's politics are viewed through a paradigm 
governed by reductive oppositions (such as feudalist/capitalist, prein-
dustrial/industrial), broad definitions of the bourgeoisie, and unchallenged 
ideological presuppositions about the idyllic conditions of the precapitalist 
agrarian world. 
My greatest concern, however, lies in the way the book's Marxist critical 
orientation flattens Keats's language and style; it is here that the reaction 
against Vendler has been total, and perhaps too extreme. At times the Keats 
who appears in these pages seems too much like an essayist, a journalist, a 
commentator, and not enough like a poet. The author's approach requires 
that we read through Keats's style, as if the richness and beauty of his lan-
guage were just one more sign of his commitment to patriarchy. Although 
Watkins would probably argue that I myself am a part of the dominant 
white-male academy that fetishizes aesthetics and valorizes linguistic com-
plexity, I cannot help feeling that his analysis, acute though it often is, takes 
the fun out of reading Keats. 
Muhlenberg College Grant F. Scott 
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Faulkner and Modernism: Rereading and Rewriting by Richard C. Moreland. 
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. Pp. ix + 259. $37.50, 
cloth; $14.75, paper. 
The paperback edition of Richard C. Moreland's Faulkner and Modernism: 
Rereading and Rewriting comes caparisoned with praise. One commentator 
speaks of "[Moreland's] impressive intellectual rigor .... [and] sensitivity to 
recent structuralist, Marxist, and deconstructive writings," The other, more 
lavish, says, "I have never been more sure about the worth and impact of a 
new publication . . . nor . . . more excited about the direction Faulkner 
studies will take as the result of a new book." 
The reasons for the praise are evident. Moreland's study is a theoretically 
and intellectually sophisticated examination of an issue central to our under-
standing of the shape and meaning of Faulkner's career. In part, though only 
in part, the book is a Marxist-materialist rejoinder to John T. Irwin's Doubling 
and Incest / Repetition and Revenge, which still, after nearly twenty years, of-
fers the regnant reading of the meaning of repetition in Faulkner's fiction. In 
contrast to Irwin's view, that Faulknerian repetition enacts a psychological 
and cultural drama of failed Oedipal resolution, Moreland argues that Faulk-
ner moves, in mid-career, toward an ameliorative vision of repetition's possi-
bilities-toward, in Moreland's terms, "revisionary" rather than "compulsive" 
repetition. 
At stake in this argument is an attempt to position Faulkner favorably in 
relation to postmodernist critiques of High Literary Modernism. Using 
Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia" as his primary orienting text, Moreland 
interprets modernism as a cultural equivalent of melancholy, which Freud 
describes as a compulsive repetition of a scene of trauma or loss~ in an at-
tempt to gain control of it. This attempt is always vain because, unlike 
mourning, melancholy does not work through and relinqUish the core experi-
ence of pain or loss. Unlike mourning, that is, melancholy does not grieve. 
Modernism's cultural version of melancholy consists of a refusal to accept the 
inherently political nature of human existence-or, in a more general sense, 
to accept change and death. The characteristic intellectual and literary re-
sponses this refusal engenders are nostalgia and irony-nostalgia for a per-
sonal or cultural Eden somewhere back before history, and "a Mandarin-like 
disdain," in Hayden White's characterization of irony as a world view, "for 
those seeking to grasp the nature of social reality in either science or art" 
(Metahistory, 23). 
In an argument bearing some resemblance to Eric Sundquist's in Faulkner: 
The House Divided, Moreland sees Faulkner as gradually freeing himself from 
modernism's world view. Focusing on the repeated rewritings of the "primal 
scene" of young Thomas Sutpen's rejection at the plantation door, Moreland 
shows how Faulkner moves beyond the" nostalgia and irony of his earlier fic-
tion, largely by extending imaginative sympathy to an increasing range of 
marginalized groups-poor whites in "Bam Burning" and The Hamlet, blacks 
in Go Down, Moses, women in Requiem for a Nun. Moreland's argument also 
explores a significant shift in the mode and method of Faulkner's fiction-a 
discovery~ in Moreland's words, of how "humor, mourning, and different 
voices" provide "three openings for critical escape from Absalom's compulSive 
primal scene" (9). 
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Much of this is fresh, challenging, and exciting. Although the notion of re-
visionary patterns of repetition in Faulkner's fiction has been around since at 
least 1980, when it was explored, though incompletely, by David Wyatt in 
Prodigal Sons, no one has examined the idea with Moreland's thoroughness, 
intelligence, reach, and theoretical rigor. Yet when all due praise has been 
given, Moreland's book must be said to be deeply unsatisfactory, so much so 
that if the choice were limited to reading Faulkner Moreland's way or to not 
reading Faulkner, one might well choose not to read Faulkner. 
A pervasive problem is the book's downplaying of the tragic dimension of 
Faulkner's vision, particularly in relation to the groups of marginalized char-
acters at the center of its argument. As the son of an immigrant father and a 
hill-country mother, neither of whom received more than an eighth-grade 
education, I would be the last to deny that class, race, and gender inequality 
victimizes large numbers of Americans. But Moreland seems reluctant to ac-
knowledge the further truth, that this victimization, when internalized, re-
sults in a self- and other-laceration not directly accessible to political forms of 
redress. Moreland's reluctance results in an oddly-skewed series of readings: 
1) an interpretation of "Bam Burning" in which a brief and grudging ac-
knowledgement of the pain Ab Snopes causes is separated by over one hun-
dred pages from the main discussion of the story; 2) an interpretation of The 
Hamlet in which criticisms of Plem Snopes's chicanery are always interpreted 
as scapegoating on the part of the residents of Frenchman's Bend; and, most 
strikingly, 3) a view of Requiem for a Nun's Nancy Mannigoe and Temple 
Drake as a hardy band of proto-feminists, dedicated to "radical breaks in cer-
tain habits of thought and practice surrounding sexual and gender issues" 
(238)-including, evidently, a highly unusual reconceptualizing of the notion 
of female responsibility for infant nurture! 
A larger difficulty is the book's Reaganite moral economy, its easy assump-
tion, in both artistic and political terms, of inflationary solutions to the 
psychic and social dilemmas it discusses. At one point, Moreland quotes Irv-
ing Howe's 1952 challenge to Faulkner to "examin[e] Negro consciousness 
from within, rather than as it is seen or surmised by white characters" (162). 
The objection to Howe's challenge that immediately springs to mind-that of 
the unbridgeable alterity of black experience-measures the critical and polit-
ical distance we have travelled since 1952. Moreland disregards this objec-
tion, instead arguing that the "strategic nonarticulateness" of Faulkner's 
blacks is a form of speech. This disregard, when combined with a similar dis-
regard on the fronts of class and gender, produces a vision of Faulkner as se-
renely and imperially appropriating to his own uses provinces of marginal 
discourse. One wonders how black and female and lower-class readers will 
respond to this interpretation. However they do, it should be clear that the 
interpretation avoids confronting an essential problem of a multi-racial, egali-
tarian democracy-the problem of how to negotiate accommodations among 
the varying, often incommensurate, political agendas of different races and 
classes, and of the two sexes. (Moreland's view seems to be that no negotia-
tion is necessary, that we can simply endlessly diversify, in both psychic and 
social terms. This is not, I think, Faulkner's view, nor that of most responsi-
ble social critics.) 
Moreland's inflationary economy has other unfortunate consequences. For 
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one, it seriously distorts the shape of Faulkner's later career, by ignoring his 
evident dismay over the disappearance of a traditional, pre-modem south. 
For another, it dec1asses, deracinates, and degenders Faulkner himself. David 
Hume says somewhere that there is a little testicle in everything we do. Con-
temporary feminist theory alerts us, if a warning indeed be needed, to the re-
stricted reference of the pronoun ih this statement. It also demonstrates, 
through the agency of ecriture feminine, the hymeneal quality inhabiting 
everything women do. But neither these cautionary observations, nor the evi-
dent permeability of the two identities, the presence of the female within the 
male and the male within the female, overturns the truth-the essential truth 
-of Hume's observation. William Faulkner is a white male southern bour-
geois writer. Many people are willing to argue that this is no very bad set of 
identities for him to possess. But one would rather see him excoriated for 
possessing them than see them ignored in the way Moreland ignores them. 
His doing so gnosticizes a very considerable, and quite refractory, artistic tal-
ent. It creates a Faulkner without ego, without personal, artistic, or familial 
ambition, without pride of sex or region, without conflict, without anguish-
a Faulkner, in short, profoundly and irretrievably boring. 
Faulkner and Modernism also leads one to meditate on the sad fate literary 
appreciation has suffered in recent years. The book is grammatically correct, 
precise and clear in its argument, rigorous and self-consistent in its use of an-
alytic terminology. But it is largely indifferent to the delights of language, 
either Faulkner's or the author's own. Consider the following example: 
But lest such mistaken belief seem to be finally corrected and replaced 
in The Hamlet by a simplistically innocent (structurally anti-Semitic) 
scapegoating of a newly demystified, delegitimated liberal capitalism-
or by a simplistically ironic acceptance (and remystification) of that 
same capitalism-Faulkner in "The Fire and the Hearth" rewrites again 
Flem's apparently pure, bloodless capitalism in the effectively critical 
context of its relation to that more complex, reciprocal, symbolic ex-
change which it attempts but fails to reduce altogether to token count-
ers or alibis within its own systematization of exchange. (168) 
Faulkner had some highly idiosyncratic ways of relating to the systematiza-
tion of exchange. When asked how he managed to sit through seemingly in-
terminable Hollywood story conferences, he said, "] just keep saying to my-
self, 'They're going to pay me on Saturday. They're going to pay me on Sat-
urday.'" Academic reviewing is not a paying profeSSion, but as I worked my 
way through Moreland's theoretically rigorous, determinedly unliterary, 
seemingly interminable sentences, I found myself thinking that it ought to 
be. 
University of California, Davis Karl F. Zender 
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Painterly Abstraction in Modernist American Poetry: The Contemporaneity of 
Modernism by Charles Altieri. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Pp. 529. $49.50. 
Elizabeth Bishop concludes the long, miscellaneous travelogue of "Over 
2,000 Illustrations and a Complete Concordance" with a complaint: the sights 
that seemed so full of significance when pictured in the family Bible appear 
trivial and mundane when visited in person. The aching desire with which 
she ends the poem is that significance might make itself plain to the eye; her 
ambition is to look so hard, so deeply, as to look "our infant sight away." 
This ambition is a common one among modem poets, who often call upon 
eyesight to transcend its dumb condition and speak, or, as Charles Altieri 
puts it in Painterly Abstraction in Modernist American Poetry, "to marshal the 
necessary responding intelligence that leads it far beyond the immediate 
moment of vision without ever turning the object into symbol or sign" (186). 
According to Altieri, the modem poet's emulation of the modern painter be-
gins with the apparent ability of abstract art to accomplish this seemingly 
impossible task, to push the resources of vision so far they yield a signifi-
cance as powerful as that provided by history or theology. Seen with such an 
eye, the sites of Bishop's travelogue would have brimmed with the sort of 
meaning her Bible provided by adding words to the picture. 
In Altieri's account, the gap between the Bible illustration, with its load of 
significance, and the empty site itself is expressed as a set of contradictions 
that have become peculiarly acute in the modern period. These "insuperable 
gaps" between fact and value, judgment and subjectivity, the public and the 
private, have been opened up by "the increasing reliance of Western culture 
on empiricist criteria" (1). Empiricism has left the modern writer stranded be-
fore a scene once full of significance and meaning but now revealed as a 
mere sand pit, grubby and ignorable. The allure of abstract art comes from its 
power to transform sand into spirit without adding any ingredients. 
Altieri calls the sort of art that can accomplish this difficult trick 
"constructivist abstraction." Manipulating the canvas in such a way as to re-
veal its own powers of construction, abstract art creates what Altieri calls a 
"metaphysical theater" (34) on whose stage physical relationships mime the 
imagination behind them. Working with the purely literal, with materials as 
plain as Mondrian's lines and squares, the abstract artist creates out of the 
syntax of shapes an allegory of the shaping spirit. The literal is lifted above 
itself by this allegory, which, unlike traditional allegory, does not promise 
anything beyond the site itself. Instead, constructivist abstraction lends sig-
nificance "by making the composing energies [of the artist] exemplify possible 
dispositions of mind with which an audience is invited to identify" (396). 
In this way, constructivist abstraction leads the arts past the contradictions 
of modernity, linking the empirical to spirit without asking it to surrender 
any of its literal meanness, linking individual passions and energies to 
"transpersonal and law-governed states" (103) by objectifying in spatial rela-
tionships the potentialities of the individual imagination. This solution is ob-
viously and openly Kantian: "The inner coherence that in Kant depended on 
fidelity to the form and content of the rational law is available for artists 
through the coherence that they give their compositional act" (121). In fact, 
i 
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Altieri re-introduces us to an old friend, "purposiveness without purpose," 
that "undefinable inner lawfulness of the work" (104) that has been from the 
very inception of modernism its peculiar claim to seriousness and moral 
probity even when its content has seemed idiosyncratic or depraved. Thus 
Altieri boldly returns to the debate on modernism a whole set of concepts 
whose stock has fallen so low it has virtually dropped from sight: formalism; 
autonomy; aesthetic idealism. To say these words nowadays is to risk having 
one's mouth washed out with soap, but even readers who may harbor their 
own sneaking admiration for one or the other of them might wonder at their 
effect on the argument of this book. 
Altieri declares at the outset that he does not intend to connect poetry and 
painting in any of the usual ways, not by exposing a cultural or intellectual 
context that contains them both, nor by describing specific influences and 
borrowings. Nor does he intend to follow in the tradition begun by Jean 
Hagstrum and continued by W. J. T. Mitchell and Wendy Steiner by propos-
ing an aesthetic theory that can link language and visual images. Instead, the 
argument relies on analogy, which is to say on the idealism of aesthetic 
idealism. The analogies themselves are somewhat circular, dependent as they 
are on terms like "semantics" or "syntax," applied without explicit justifica-
tion to painting and then loaned back, as it were, to poetry. This kind of ana-
logical reasoning removes all the resistance between the arts created by their 
very different material realities. Writers closest to the visual arts often have a 
far livelier sense of these differences, which is why Frank O'Hara wrote 
"Why I Am Not a Painter," and why Gertrude Stein, for all her admiration of 
Picasso, bristied when he tried to write poetry. The ease with which Altieri's 
argument slides from painter to poet even when there are ,no specific connec-
tions to be made suggests one danger of aesthetic idealisrn, which can bleed 
the individual fact of all its specificity and relieve the critic of the need to 
theorize the relationship between very different arts. 
It may also be worth noting that Altieri calls on Kant to resolve contradic-
tions that at least some later philosophers, notably Hegel, thought were 
caused by Kant. When Altieri defends the concept of a subjectivity "so funda-
mental to certain recurrent human experiences that it is impossible to bind to 
the practices of a specific society" (374), he resurrects a transcendental ideal 
often blamed for the very split between subject and object, private and pub-
lic, he begins by lamenting. Though Altieri tends to blame this split on empi-
ricism, it has been common since Kant to see his ahistorical formalism as 
equally, if very differently, to blame. 
Similar reservations might be based on the criteria Altieri establishes for 
himself at the outset, when he says he wants to show how an understanding 
of modernist abstraction "helps us to read concrete works of art closely" (8). 
To this end, after four long chapters of background, the argument turns to a 
series of poets: first Eliot, who stages certain problems without being able to 
solve them; then Williams, Stein, Stevens, Moore, and Yeats, who illustrate 
various modes of abstraction; and then Pound and Stevens again, who stand 
as the most successful translators of constructivist abstraction into poetry. In-
terestingly, the freshest readings are those of Eliot, whose failure is described 
as an unresolved "struggle between metonymy and metaphor" (149). These 
readings refresh precisely because Altieri need not defend Eliot by making 
• 
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everything in his work cohere, so that instead of standing as modernism's 
ideal example of "purposiveness without purpose," The Waste Land indicates 
instead the nagging absence of the ideal. This is not because the poem fails 
to synthesize, but rather because it synthesizes so relentlessly and on so 
many different levels that synthesis overwhelms itself and collapses in confu-
sion. In contrast, Altieri describes the success of Pound and Stevens in much 
more conventional terms, as the discovery of "relational principles that can 
be direct testimony to some basic truth or possible value" (314). The ethical 
success of art has been measured by the quality and extent of its internal re-
lations at least since Pater, and the only thing that distinguishes Altieri's ver-
sion of this standard from, say, Kenner's patterned energies, is its level of ab-
straction. 
Altieri has another ambition besides offering new readings of the major 
modernist poets. The sub-title of this volume is a purposely provocative ges-
ture aimed at the post-modem anti-modernist consensus, which, Altieri sug-
gests, has not overcome modernism but merely recreated its antinomies at 
another level. Despite its reliance on widely discredited concepts like auton-
omy, the sort of aesthetic neo-liberalism offered here is, Altieri claims, much 
more seriously engaged in the political than most post-modernisms: "We find 
ourselves affirming lyric desires and modes of creative activity that rely 
solely on powers in ourselves that we realize, as we exercise them, are also 
available to everyone else" (213). What Altieri attempts to do, then, is to be-
gin an aesthetic version of the post-Rawlsian project to drag from liberal for-
malism some fundamental moral or ethical principles. The very need to for-
malize, to generalize, becomes in this version an ethical guarantee: "If we can 
project what constitutes the full intensity of our individualizing energies, and 
if we have articulate public testimony for the emotional engagements such 
energies mobilize, we have strong grounds for insisting that a political sys-
tem is legitimate only to the degree to which it makes those maximal condi-
tions of experience available to an entire populace" (376). Thus the autonomy 
of the individual mind, with all its constructivist energies and powers, be-
comes by analogical extension the basis of the polis. 
The engagement of this book with specific works of art and literature may 
be a bit shallow, its attempts to theorize the concrete connections between 
the arts fitful and incomplete, because its real interests are political. Altieri in-
tends to mount an argument for modernism that will confound its many an-
tagonists by showing that aesthetic modernism provides a sounder basis for 
solving the basic political problems of the contemporary period than any of 
its successor movements. What he calls "aesthetic idealism" is what post-
structuralism has denounced under the name of "aesthetic ideology," and he 
intends to argue, in the very teeth of the opposition, that such widely dis-
credited concepts as subjectivity, autonomy, coherence, reconciliation, are in 
fact the building blocks of an emancipatory politics. Where most contempo-
rary critics follow Benjamin and denounce any attempt to resolve political is-
sues by translating them into aesthetic terms, Altieri bases his entire claim for 
modernism on precisely this translation. Painterly Abstraction thus takes its 
place among other recent volumes, by writers as drastically different as Leon 
Chai and Terry Eagleton, that attempt to begin the rehabilitation of the aes-
thetic itself. 
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At the most basic level, both the weaknesses and the strengths of this book 
come from the militant position it must assume if it is to grant any value to 
the aesthetic at all. The writing is characterized by a restless proliferation of 
needlessly oblique terms for the same basic constructivist qualities: "imagina-
tive attitudes"; "figurative energies"; "legislative ~nergies"; "mobile lyric 
energies"; "constitutive intensities," These, and another set of terms having to 
do with scene and agency, which recall Kenneth Burke and could benefit 
from some reference to him, give the impression that Altieri is painfully and 
elaborately inventing his own language. This hardly seems worth the im-
mense effort, since many of the basic concepts in this argument are old and 
familiar. Yet, in a time when the aesthetic itself needs defense, it may be nec-
essary to mount a strategy that laboriously reinvents the wheel. The dogged-
ness of the argument will also daunt many readers, though it is most extrava-
gantly protracted in a series of prodigious footnotes that can be skipped. But 
the author may very well lay his reasoning out at such length because he 
feels that he is taking an uncommon and unpopular position, and it is the 
real strength of this book that it does not shrink from entertaining ideas usu-
ally dyed with the deepest dye. To defend abstraction, modernism, liberal-
ism, aestheticism, formalism, and idealism all in one book has at least the 
virtue of courage. If the book does not succeed in rehabilitating these terms, 
if it does not make us forget why they have fallen into disrepute, it may still 
revitalize the debate by recalling why they once had such persuasive power. 
University of California, Los Angeles Michael North 
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